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TORT LAW-New Mexico Imposes Strict Liability on a
Private Employer of an Independent Contractor
for Harm From Dangerous Work, but Bestows
Immunity on a Government Employer: Saiz v. Belen
School District
I. INTRODUCTION
In Saiz v. Belen School District,, the New Mexico Supreme Court
departed from widely accepted principles of the nondelegable duty doctrine
by making an employer of an independent contractor strictly liable for
harm that results from the contractor's inherently dangerous work because
a reasonable precaution was omitted. Under the previously unused "public
policy" exception to several liability, the court further found that such
strict liability gives rise to joint and several liability with the contractors
2
which remains even though the contractors' liability is time-barred.
Prior to Saiz, an employer could be held liable for reasonably foreseeable harm caused by an independent contractor's negligence in performing inherently dangerous work.3 Saiz supersedes New Mexico law
by imposing strict liability on an employer of an independent contractor
who is attributed with retrospective knowledge of all circumstances giving
rise to liability. The court's application of strict liability is especially
remarkable in that the court ultimately held the school district immune
from liability because the New Mexico Tort Claims Act protects a government entity from strict liability claims. Consequently, a private property
owner can never avoid liability with certainty for inherently dangerous
work performed by an independent contractor, while a government entity
can always avoid liability by contracting out dangerous work to independent contractors.
This Note examines traditional nondelegable duty analysis, the new
analysis under Saiz, and the ramifications of the decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1964, the Belen School District contracted with an architect, an
electrical engineer, and an electric company to design and build outdoor
lighting for its high school football field. The completed system consisted
of wooden light poles with underground electric cable, some of which
were installed directly in front of the bleachers. In about 1973, the school

1. 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992).

2. Id. at 400-01, 827 P.2d at 115-16.
3. See, e.g., Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953) (defendant landowner
fully responsible for harm caused by contractor's negligence in spraying crops with inherently
dangerous chemical); Budagher v. Amrep Corp., 97 N.M. 116, 637 P.2d 547 (1981) (defendant
ignored notice of faulty design of dams prior to construction which later caused flooding to plaintiff's
property).
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district built a metal fence in front of the bleachers and near some of
the light poles.
On September 2, 1988, during halftime of a football game, thirteenyear-old Jerry Saiz was electrocuted after he simultaneously touched a
metal electrical conduit running up one of the poles and the metal fence.
He died a few minutes later. Damaged insulation around the buried cable
and the absence of a bushing, required under 4 the state electric code,
caused an electrical short and the electrocution.
Lorenzo Saiz, the estate's personal representative, brought a wrongful
death action under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act5 against the school
district, alleging that the school district was negligent in the installation
and maintenance of the electrical system. The school district attributed
fault to the contractors and architect as non-parties, who were statutorily
immune from suit because the death occurred more than ten years after
they installed the electrical system .6
The trial court instructed the jury that, under the circumstances, an
employer cannot be liable for the acts of an independent contractor. 7
The jury's verdict for the plaintiff apportioned sixty-five percent of the
$1,250,000 damages to the electrical contractor, twenty-five percent to
the architect, and fifteen percent to the school district.
Saiz appealed, arguing that since the work with electricity was inherently
dangerous, the school district should be held jointly and severally liable
on a theory of vicarious liability for the negligence of the electrical
contractor and the architect.9 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment
on the grounds that the school district could not be held vicariously
liable for the work of an independent contractor performed long ago.' 0
The question of whether the school district could be held responsible for
the faulty lighting system as initially installed and inspected by the
independent contractors went to the supreme court on a writ of certiorari."
The supreme court found that the school district was strictly and jointly
and severally liable for injuries caused by "the absence of precautions
required in the face of peculiar risks of harm created by locating a highvoltage electrical supply line in an area of public accommodation.' 1 2 The

4. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 392, 827 P.2d at 107.
5. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-1 to -28 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
6. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) (barring any action against construction
professionals ten years after a project's completion); see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
7. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 392-93, 827 P.2d at 107-08.
8. Id. at 393, 827 P.2d at 108. Neither the contractor nor the architect were liable as a matter
of law. The jury, however, found the school district negligent in its installation of the fence and
its failure to warn despite its apparent awareness that the lighting system was faulty.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The court granted leave to file amicus briefs to the New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association,
aligned with Saiz, and to the Risk Management Division of the General Services Department of
the State of New Mexico, aligned with the school district, neither of which argued a strict liability
theory.
12. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 391, 827 P.2d at 106.
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court found the school district immune from strict liability, however,
under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. 3

III. DISCUSSION
A.

An Employers'/Owner's Traditional Liability For Harm Resulting
from Dangerous Work of an Independent Contractor
In attaching strict liability to the doctrine of nondelegable duty, the
court in Saiz abandoned widely accepted principles, but failed to provide
a sound substitute. The court rejected the traditional application of
vicarious liability based on the contractors' negligence.' 4 The court also
rejected the application of traditional direct liability based on the employer's negligence to the extent that such liability is based on the
reasonably prudent person standard of care. 5 The court's use of precedent
for its finding of strict liability indicates just how radical, if not quirky,
that finding is. The court rejected the approach of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and numerous modern American cases which employ
traditional liabilities arising from the contractor's or the employers'/
owner's negligence. Instead, the court cited only one case from another
country and century, in support
of its proposition that liability arises
6
without regard to negligence.'
Although the general rule is that an employer/owner is not liable for
the acts of an independent contractor, 7 there are several exceptions. One
exception involves work that is "specially, peculiarly, or inherently dangerous. "' 8 The Restatement elaborates in two sections. Section 416 states:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the
employer should recognize as likely to create during its progress a
peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are
taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the
failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such
precautions, even though the employer9 has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise.'
Section 427 states:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving
a special danger to others which the employer knows or has reason

13. Id. at 39, 827 P.2d at 106.
14. "We reject any coupling of the concept of vicarious liability and nondelegable duty." Id.
at 399, 827 P.2d at 114.
15. Id. at 402, 827 P.2d at 117.
16. Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B.D. 321 (1876), cited in Saiz, 113 N.M. at 395, 827 P.2d at 110.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965); see also Scott v. Murphy Corporation, 79
N.M. 697, 448 P.2d 803 (1969).
18. Id. § 409 cmt. b (discussing exceptions).
19. Id. § 416 (emphasis added), cited in Saiz, 113 N.M. at 394-96, 827 P.2d at 109-11.
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to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or which he
contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract,
is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the
contractor's failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger. 2
For all practical purposes, the two rules "are apparently intended to

mean very much the same thing. They have been used more or less
interchangeably by the courts," '2' with the distinction that the "special

precautions" of section 416 pertain to "some one specific precaution,"
where the "inherent danger" of section 427 pertains to the need for "a

whole set of precautions, against a number of hazards . . . ."
Inherently or specially dangerous work gives rise to a duty which an
employer may not delegate to the contractor. 23 The concepts of an
employers'/owner's nondelegable duty have been widely accepted and
have been adopted in New Mexico. 24 Generally, courts have followed the
Restatement in applying vicarious liability. 25 Some courts have rejected
vicarious liability in favor of direct liability arising from the employers'/
owner's own negligence in failing to ensure reasonable precautions, particularly when the employer/owner is a government entity. Prior to Saiz,

New Mexico courts finding liability arising from an employer/owner's
nondelegable duty did not explicitly label or analyze the nature of the
27
liability. 26 Strict liability had never been considered or suggested.

Traditionally, strict liability has been restricted to "abnormally dangerous work," 2 even though the "defendant . . . has exercised the utmost
care to prevent the harm." ' 29 In addition, strict liability applies only if

20. Id. § 427 (emphasis added), cited in Saiz, 113 N.M. at 394-96, 827 P.2d at 109-11.
21. W. PAGE KEETON ET A.L., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 512-13
(5th ed. 1984).
22. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, Topic 2, at 394.
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, Topic 2, at 394.
24. See Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953); Budagher v. Amrep Corp.,
97 N.M. 116, 637 P.2d 547 (1981); see also Montanez v. Cass, 89 N.M. 32, 546 P.2d 1189 (Ct.
App. 1975) (employer liable to third persons for harm caused by the independent contractor who
was engaged in the performance of inherently dangerous work), rev'd in part on other grounds sub
nom., New Mexico Electric Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 89 N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634 (1976) (employer's
liability does not extend to employees of the independent contractor).
25. These are "rules of vicarious liability, making the employer liable for the negligence of the
contractor, irrespective of whether the employer has himself been at fault." RESTATEMENT, supra
note 17, Topic 2, at 394; see, e.g., Deitz v. Jackson, 291 S.E.2d 282, 285-86 (N.C. 1982); Western
Stock Center, Inc. v. Sevit, Inc., 578 P.2d 1045, 1049-50 (Colo. 1978), cited in Saiz, 113 N.M. at
396, 827 P.2d at 111.
26. See supra note 24.
27. There is nothing to indicate that the Saiz holding regarding strict liability pertains to separate
rules of employer liability based on the employer's or the contractor's negligence beyond the
nondelegable duty doctrine arising from inherently or specially dangerous work. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, §§ 410-429 (exclusive of §§ 416 and 427).
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, §§ 519, 520. The First Restatement labeled the activity as
"ultrahazardous."
29. Restatement, supra note 17, § 519 cmt. d; see also KEETON, supra note 20, § 79 (regarding
work that is "dangerous in spite of all reasonable care, so that strict liability might be imposed
upon the employer ....
").
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the "defendant is aware of the abnormally dangerous condition or activity,
and has voluntarily engaged in or permitted it.''30 In New Mexico, the
"ultrahazardous activity doctrine has been restricted ... to the use of
explosives in blasting."'"
32
Then-Chief Justice Traynor, who pioneered strict products liability,
considered strict liability in the context of the nondelegable duty doctrine
in the California case of Maloney v. Rath.13 He invoked Restatement
rules other than sections 416 and 427, but within the same topic concerning
harm caused by the negligence of a carefully selected contractor.3 4 In
Maloney, the defendant's brakes had failed, causing a car accident and
injuries to the plaintiff. The defendant "neither knew nor had reason
to know" 35 of the defective brakes, and indeed had them completely
overhauled three months earlier .16 The mechanic's negligence which caused
the failure was "no defense ' "' 3 to the defendant, who was found liable
under the nondelegable duty doctrine.
While the defendant essentially was held to liability without personal
fault, Justice Traynor declined to apply strict liability to the nondelegable
duty doctrine. 3 He reasoned that making such an "abrupt change in the
law . . . [would] create uncertainty" where varying facts of future cases
would prevent predictability of that application.39 In addition, "[tlo the
extent that recognition of nondelegable duties tends to insure that there
will be a financially responsible defendant available 4... it ameliorates
the need for strict liability to secure compensation."
B. An Employer/Owner's Strict Liability Under Saiz For Harm
Resulting from Dangerous Work of an Independent Contractor
As broad as the liability arising from a nondelegable duty was to the
defendant in Maloney, liability to future potential defendants under Saiz
is even broader. The Saiz court did not fully articulate the basis for
rejecting traditional liabilities arising from a nondelegable duty, although
the rejection of vicarious liability makes some sense. By definition, a

30. KEETON, supra note 20, § 79.
31. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 397, 827 P.2d at 112 (citing Thigpen v. Skousen & Hise, 64 N.M. 290,
327 P.2d 802 (1958)).
32. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Calif. 1963). Chief Justice
Ransom analogized strict liability of a nondelegable duty to strict products liability. Saiz, 113 N.M.
at 394, 397, 402, 827 P.2d at 109, 112, 117.
33. 445 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
34. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, at 394. Justice Traynor detailed activities that would give rise
to a nondelegable duty, including "the duty to exercise due care when an 'independent contractor
is employed to do work which the employer should recognize as necessarily creating a condition
involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others unless special precautions are taken."'
Maloney, 445 P.2d at 516 (quoting Courtell v. McEachen, 334 P.2d 870, 874 (Cal. 1959).
35. Maloney, 445 P.2d at 514.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 517.
38. Id. 445 P.2d at 515.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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nondelegable duty is inconsistent with vicarious liability which is based
on a delegation to another. 4' In addition, the Saiz court's specification
that "[ilt should not be required that the contractor be liable ' 42 is
significant where, as in Saiz, the negligent contractor is immune from
suit. 43 Less clear is the court's basis for rejecting traditional direct liability
based on the employer's own negligence in not ensuring reasonably
foreseeable safeguards." The court in Saiz admonished that "the policy
behind the law in torts does more than compensate victims-it encourages
reasonable safeguards against the risk of harm." ' 45 However, the court
did not discuss how strict liability would accomplish greater regard for
precautions than either vicarious or direct liability based on negligence
would.4 The court merely analogized to strict products liability, and
dictated that "it serves the policy underlying nondelegable duties to impose
liability on the owner or occupier of land for injury proximately caused
by any failure to take reasonable precautions." 47
The new strict liability seems contradictory because the analysis implies
negligence considerations even as the court rejects them:
The test of liability is the presence or absence of precautions that
would be deemed reasonably necessary by one to whom knowledge
of all the circumstances is attributed; and liability is dependent on
neither the lack of care taken by the contractor nor the lack of care
taken by the48 employer to ensure that the contractor takes necessary
precautions.
According to this test, since neither the contractor's nor the employer's
negligence is relevant, neither vicarious nor direct liability is applicable.
However, negligence considerations seem inherent in the analysis. Liability
arises only when "reasonably necessary'' 49 precautions are not taken,
suggesting that either an independent contractor or an employer/owner

41. "Under vicarious liability, one person, although entirely innocent of any wrongdoing and
without regard to duty, is nonetheless held responsible for harm caused by the act of another."
Saiz, 113 N.M. at 399, 827 P.2d at 114 (emphasis in original).
42. Id.
43. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) (barring any action against construction
professionals ten years after a project's completion); see also infra notes 63-64 and accompanying

text.
44. See Saiz, 113 N.M. at 402, 827 P.2d at 117.

45. Id.at 398, 827 P.2d at 113.
46. Indeed, if an independent contractor knows that the employer is strictly and jointly liable

for the absence of a reasonable precaution, his or her incentive to exercise greater caution may be
diminished.
47. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 399-400, 827 P.2d at 114-15. Accordingly, the court held that strict liability
arising from a nondelegable duty results in joint and several liability under the heretofore unused
public policy exception to several liability. Id. at 400, 827 P.2d at 115 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-3A-1(C)(4) (Supp. 1987)).
Although the use of the public policy exception is remarkable by itself, it is less remarkable in
the context of the case. Under a traditional application of vicarious liability to the doctrine of
nondelegable duty, the school district could have been found jointly and severally liable under the
vicarious liability exception. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(2) (Supp. 1987). Presumably, the court
could have engaged in the same policy reasoning under traditional direct liability.
48. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 395, 827 P.2d at 110.
49. Id.at 396, 827 P.2d at Il1 (emphasis added).
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would foresee the need for the precaution. In addition, the court emphasized "that more than mere foreseeability of injury is required ....
That is, there must exist a strong probability that harm will result . . . .0
Moreover, the "employer's nondelegable duty runs only to a hazard
associated with a peculiar risk or special danger the employer as a matter
of law had reason to anticipate."5 1
Despite these explicit references to foreseeability, the court rejects
foreseeability as a factor in favor of a full knowledge standard. The test
for liability is incorporated in the jury's decision of "what precautions
would be deemed reasonably necessary by one to whom knowledge of
all the circumstances is attributed."52 Analogizing to strict products liability, the court asserts that:
[T]he question is whether injury was proximately caused by a risk
that a hypothetical reasonably prudent person having full knowledge
of the risk would find unacceptable even though the person to be
charged in fact neither knew nor could have known of such risk at
the time of the work. 3
The court proceeded to eliminate the element of foreseeability from
traditional direct liability 54 in order to accommodate strict liability:
Traditionally .

.

. direct liability (as distinguished from vicarious li-

ability) has depended on what the party to be charged knew or should
have known. Direct liability of the possessor of land under a nondelegable duty to ensure against an unreasonable risk of injury from
a special danger is based not on what the possessor knew or should
have known .... This is strict liability ....5
Because
traditional
tradictory.
tradiction.

some of the court's language seems indistinguishable from
negligence analysis, the application of strict liability is conThe "full knowledge" standard resolves that apparent conWith this standard, the court made the leap from traditional

50. Id.

51. Id. at 397, 827 P.2d at 112 (emphasis added). The RESTATEMENT provides that "the employer
remains liable for injuries resulting from dangers which he should contemplate at the time that he
enters into the contract ...." REsTATMENT, supra note 17, § 416 cmt. a (emphasis added). Further,
in Budagher, defendant was found liable for flooding damage to the plaintiff's property due to
the faulty construction of dams done by an independent contractor on the defendant's land. Despite
notice that the design of the dams was faulty, and that structural failure could result in loss of
life, the defendant proceeded with construction. Budagher, 97 N.M. at 120, 637 P.2d at 551.
52. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 396, 827 P.2d at Ill (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 402, 827 P.2d at 117 (emphasis in original).
54. In establishing strict liability, the court repeatedly called the liability direct: "Today we
address whether a nondelegable duty gives rise to direct strict liability ... or whether it gives rise
I..."
Id.
at 394, 827 P.2d at 109. "This liability is direct, not vicarious."
to vicarious liability .

Id. at 395, 827 P.2d at 110. "The employer's liability for breach of a nondelegable duty is direct,
not vicarious." Id. at 396, 827 P.2d at 111. "[D]irect liability is not dependent upon any apportionment
Id. at 400, 827 P.2d at 115.
to an employer of his or her concurrent negligence .
55. Id. at 402, 827 P.2d at 117.
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liabilities premised upon one's negligence to strict liability, unabashedly
taking along language of reasonable foreseeability. The test for liability
is not what a reasonable person would have done based on what that
person knew or reasonably should have known at the time of commencing
the work. The test is what a reasonable person would have done had
the person been bestowed with full knowledge, even though such full
knowledge was unachievable by a reasonable person. From the perspective
of an all-knowing, reasonably prudent person "there must exist a strong
probability that harm will result

. . ."56

from "a peculiar risk or special

danger the employer . . . had reason to anticipate"57 against which that
person would ensure a "reasonably necessary""5 precaution. It is irrelevant
that a reasonably prudent person who lacks complete knowledge may
not reasonably anticipate the peculiar risk, and thus would not ensure
that the independent contractor takes the precaution. 9
C. Conjectured Application of Direct Liability to the Defendant
School District in Saiz
It is not clear what motivated the court to reject foreseeability so
completely, although conjecture about what might have happened under
traditional liabilities may shed light. Because the contractors were immune
from suit,60 the plaintiff in Saiz could not recover full damages unless
the school district was found fully liable. Under direct liability arising
from a nondelegable duty, using the traditional reasonably foreseeable
standard, a crucial question is whether the school district should have
foreseen the need for the plastic bushing which the electrical contractor
negligently omitted. 6' With a level of knowledge presumably below the
electrical contractor's, the answer could very well have been no, and thus
liability would not have been imposed. However, under the full knowledge

56. Id. at 396, 827 P.2d at Ill (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 397, 827 P.2d at 112 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 396, 827 P.2d at 111 (emphasis added).
59. Under strict liability, "the reasonableness of acts or omissions of [the landowner] is not a
consideration." Id. at 402, 827 P.2d at 117.
60. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) (barring any action against construction
professionals ten years after a project's completion); see also infra notes 63-65 and accompanying
text.
61. The question arises whether foreseeability goes to the general danger of the work or to the
reasonably necessary precaution which eliminates that danger. Certainly, electrocution is a foreseeable
danger of electrical work; however, if reasonable precautions are taken, that danger-and its
foreseeability-is eliminated. "The doctrine of nondelegable duty applies only in cases in which, in
the absence of reasonable precautions, a strong probability exists that harm will result from an
unusual type of risk." Saiz, 113 N.M. at 396-97, 827 P.2d at 111-12. Therefore, foreseeability of
harm should go to the reasonably necessary precaution which eliminates the risk of harm. Thus,
section 416 is applied "where the employer should anticipate the need for some specific precaution."
RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 416 cmt. a. Moreover, section 416 applies even though an employer
has stipulated in a contract that the independent contractor "take such precautions." Id. cmt. c.
Also see section 413, which is similar to section 416, except that it applies where no such contractual
provision exists. There, "the extent of the employer's knowledge and experience in the field of
Id. § 413 cmt. a.
I..."
work to be done is to be taken into account .
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standard, the school district would have been attributed with knowledge
of the electrical code requiring the bushing, and of the purpose for the
bushing. The effect of strict liability is to increase the likelihood that a
plaintiff who has been injured or killed due to a contractor's negligence
will have a remedy when that contractor is either not liable or not
financially responsible.
The Effect of Section 37-1-27 on an Employer of an Independent
Contractor
Perhaps the court's rejection of a vicarious liability rationale arises
from the potential effect of the "statute of repose" 62 on a plaintiff's
ability to recover damages. Where injuries result from "the defective or
unsafe condition of a physical improvement to real property" ten years
after the completion of a project, builders, engineers, and architects are
immune from suit. 63 As to the property owner, there is:
no reason not to impose full responsibility on a joint tortfeasor subject
to strict liability for breach of a nondelegable duty despite the fact
that the plaintiff's direct suit against other tortfeasors is barred, and
despite the fact that the joint tortfeasor upon whom full responsibility
falls may lack a right of contribution from those granted the immunity. 64
The court also discussed the historical purpose to exclude owners from
the benefit of the statute of repose. 65 Implicit in the court's reasoning
is that because the owner's strict liability is not predicated on the contractor's fault, that liability is therefore not extinguished by the contractor's immunity. Thus, the court avoided the possibility that under
vicarious liability, the imputed liability of an employer/owner would also
be barred.

D.

The New Mexico Tort Claims Act and Government Immunity
from Strict Liability
After devoting the bulk of its opinion to a strained and convoluted
analysis to establish strict and joint liability, the court summarily concluded that the school district, though strictly liable, was immune from
such liability under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act." This holding has

E.

62. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 401, 827 P.2d at 116 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (Repl. Pamp.
1990)).
63. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
64. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 401, 827 P.2d at 116.
65. Id.; see also Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 694, 568 P.2d 214, 220 (Ct. App), cert. denied,
91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of the statute). The Howell court
stated:
The difficulties of those covered by the statute in providing a reasonable defense
to a claim made years after the construction project was completed, the absence
of control of the premises ... and the historical difference in liability between
owners and occupiers of land and those covered by the statute provide a reasonable
basis for excluding owners and tenants from the benefits of the statute.
Id. at 694, 568 P.2d at 220.
66. Sqiz, 113 N.M. at 402, 827 P.2d at 117.
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the effect of allowing government entities to avoid liability for dangerous
work by simply hiring an independent contractor to perform that work.
This result is inconsistent with the court's carefully emphasized policy
to "encourage conscientious adherence to standards
of safety where injury
'67
likely will result in the absence of precautions.
The New Mexico legislature passed the New Mexico Tort Claims Act
("TCA")" in 1976 with the recognition of "the inherently unfair and
inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.

' 69

The TCA provides:

Liability ... shall be based upon the traditional tort concepts of
duty and the reasonably prudent person's standard of care ....The
Tort Claims Act in no way imposes a strict liability for injuries upon
governmental entities or public employees. 70
The New Mexico Court of Appeals has held that the TCA does not
waive immunity for strict liability claims. 7' The court in Saiz focused on
the specification in the TCA that "liability is to be based soley on a
reasonably prudent person standard of care. "72 Because strict liability
arising from a nondelegable duty under Saiz lacks the element of foreseeability and the application of a reasonable person standard, 7a the
court held that "the school district was immune from 'its74 joint and several
liability for the acts of the independent contractors.
IV.

ANALYSIS AND RAMIFICATIONS

The Saiz court applied strict liability without regard to fault to an
area of law where liability has traditionally been based on the lack of
reasonable care to prevent harm. In so doing, the court added confusion
and uncertainty to the law regarding employer or landowner liability for
the acts of an independent contractor who is engaged in inherently
dangerous work. The new strict liability has troublesome ramifications
for private employers of independent contractors, who are now potentially
liable for harms the prevention of which would be apparent under a

67. Id. at 400, 827 P.2d at 115. In other words, a government entity may delegate its nondelegable
duty.
68. N.M. STAT. AmN. §§ 41-4-1 to -29 (RepI Pamp. 1989).
69. Id. § 41-4-2(A).
70. Id. § 41-4-2(B).
71. McCurry v. City of Farmington, 97 N.M. 728, 643 P.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1982). Arguing the
ultrahazardous theory, the plaintiff in McCurry alleged personal injury from the toxic fumes of a
burning automobile, which the defendant Fire Department used for training purposes. The court
found that the "traditional tort concept of duty included the theory of strict liability as adopted
by our Supreme Court in Thigpen v. Skousen, 64 N.M. 290, 327 P.2d 802 (1958)." McCurry, 97
N.M. at 732, 643 P.2d at 296. However, the court reasoned, had the legislature intended to waive
immunity for strict liability, it would have done so explicitly, since Thigpen was "a part of the
law of torts" when the TCA was adopted, and the legislature is presumed to know the common
law. Id.
72. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 402, 827 P.2d at 117.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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hypothetical full-knowledge standard, but which in fact might not be
apparent under a reasonably foreseeable standard.
The court explained its elimination of foreseeability under a reasonably
prudent standard of care by emphasizing the necessity of encouraging
reasonable safeguards against harm. That elimination, however, immunizes
government employers of independent contractors engaged in inherently
dangerous work. Either the Saiz court thought that the increase of
reasonable safeguards in the private sector would outweigh the decrease
in the public sector, or the court simply did not realize the inconsistency
of immunizing the government. It is difficult to believe the former.
The court could have avoided the confusion, uncertainty, and inconsistency of its decision by applying traditional direct liability based on
a reasonably foreseeable standard to the nondelegable duty doctrine. An
employers'/owner's liability would be predicated upon his or her own
negligence in not ensuring that the contractor took a reasonable precaution
to prevent a foreseeable harm. Thus, the court would have avoided
problems of vicarious liability based on the contractor's negligence. Instead, the employer/owner's direct liability would be independent of the
contractor's liability 7 and of the contractor's immunity from suit or lack
of financial responsibility.
Absent strict liability, the Saiz court would have needed to consider
whether "liability under [traditional theories] falls within the immunity
afforded governmental entities by the exclusion of independent contractors
from the definition of public employees for whose torts the entity's
immunity is waived. ' 76 The court "infer[red] that the legislature retained
immunity for the tortious acts of independent contractors committed
within the scope of their duties. ' 77 However, an employers'/owner's
nondelegable duty-the operative term-is by definition independent of
the contractor's duties. As have other jurisdictions, the court could have
found that a nondelegable duty prevails over a governmental immunity.
The result to the parties in Saiz may have been the same had the court
found that the defendant school district was not negligent under a reasonably prudent standard of care by failing to ensure that the contractor
installed the bushing. However, the law in New Mexico concerning nondelegable duties would have been clear and predictable,' and consistent
with the court's policy of increasing reasonable safeguards against harm.
V.

CONCLUSION

Saiz has changed the law in New Mexico regarding an employer or
landowner's liability for harm that results from inherently dangerous
work performed by an independent contractor because a reasonable pre:

75.
at 114.
76.
77.
Pamp.

"It should not be required that the contractor be liable." Saiz, 113 N.M. at 399, 827 P.2d
Id. at 393 n.5, 827 P.2d at 108 (declining to reach the question).
Id. at 402 n.14, 827 P.2d at 117 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-4(D)(1), -3(E) (Repl.
1989)).
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caution was omitted. The court's hypothetical "full knowledge" standard
dispenses with foreseeability. An employer is now strictly liable without
regard to his or her own negligence, the contractor's negligence, or to
foreseeability of harm. A government entity, on the other hand, is immune
from liability.
By applying a liability void of fault consideration, the court has left
no clear standards for the potentially liable private employers of independent contractors. Liability should arise from an employer's lack of
care with respect to foreseeable precautions in the face of inherently
dangerous work. This would make the duty of a private employer/owner
clear. The same is true of a government entity, with the result of
encouraging both the contractor and the public or private employer/
owner to take reasonable safeguards. Emphasis on the nondelegable duty
doctrine as a means of attaching liability directly on an employer based
on the employer's negligence would have led to results consistent with
the court's policy and with precedent, and would have been comprehensible
to employers of independent contractors.
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